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This paper analyzes the firms’ standard practice of announcing clearance or 
“last-chance” sales, namely advertising that a particular product is not going 
to be available in the market anymore. In the context of a two-period 
signaling game, prices and advertising decisions of firms are analyzed. Then, 
the set of separating and pooling equilibria is characterized, so that the above 
usual advertising techniques can be better understood as equilibria of this 
model for certain parameter values. In particular, this paper shows that, when 
the firm which continues in the business knows that few of their current 
customers will come back in future periods, the set of separating equilibria 
shrinks. That is, fewer future prospects induce all types of firms to compete 
for current consumers, leading to pooling equilibria in which all firms 
announce a “last-chance” sale, even if some of them know they will remain 
in the industry next period. 
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Resumen 
 
Este artículo analiza la práctica de múltiples firmas respecto de anunciar 
grandes liquidaciones o “últimas rebajas”; en particular analiza el anuncio de 
que un producto concreto no estará disponible en el futuro. En el contexto de 
un juego de señalización de dos etapas, analizamos las decisiones de las 
empresas con respecto a los precios de sus productos y sus gastos en 
publicidad que anuncian liquidaciones. Esto permite caracterizar el conjunto 
de equilibrios separadores y agrupadores, lo que nos deja en condición de 
ofrecer una explicación de las anteriores técnicas publicitarias sobre grandes 
liquidaciones en el contexto de los equilibrios de nuestro modelo, para 
ciertos parámetros. En definitiva, este artículo demuestra que cuando la 
firma que continúa produciendo sabe que pocos de sus clientes volverán a 
realizar compras en el futuro, el conjunto de equilibrios separadores se 
contrae. En otras palabras, peores perspectivas de futuro inducen a todo tipo 
de empresas a competir por los clientes actuales, llevándolas hacia un 
equilibrio agrupador en el que todas las firmas anuncian grandes 
liquidaciones, incluso aquellas que saben que continuarán en el mercado 
durante el siguiente periodo.  
 
Palabras clave: señalización, publicidad, equilibrio separador, transmisión 
de información. 





Why do so many firms constantly insist that a certain store, or the entire 
company itself, is going out of business? Can we believe it, or should we 
assume that all types of firms have incentives to use this advertising 
technique? This paper analyzes these questions in a two-period signaling 
model. In particular, firms play here the role of the informed participant of 
the market, since they know whether firm will exit the market in the next 
period. After observing the firm's advertising and prices, consumers update 
their beliefs about the producer's probabilities of actually leaving the 
industry, and then decide whether to buy today, or wait until the next period. 
Specifically, we find what strategies and parameter values can support either 
a pooling equilibrium -in which all types of firms announce their imminent 
closing and set low (clearance) prices- or a separating equilibrium -where 
only certain announcements are believed. In addition, in order to restrict the 
set of admissible equilibria, Cho and Kreps' (1987) intuitive criterion is used, 
so that only equilibria in which consumers sustain relatively “reasonable” 
beliefs are considered. 
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Finally, different comparative statics analysis are carried out, which can 
specially help us to understand why, for example, this type of advertising 
campaigns have massively expanded in recent years, or why we normally 
observe more of such advertising in cities than in small towns. In particular, 
we can explain the above phenomena by the fact that an increase in the 
probability that a customer returns to a store shrinks the set of separating 
equilibria, i.e., the set of admissible price-advertising combinations that the 
exiting firm can use. Particularly, the probability that a particular customer 
returns to a given store, is smaller in a big city than in a small town, and it 
has probably decreased in recent decades as the number of stores -as well as 
the introduction of internet shopping- became more important. In turn, this 
smaller probability of having returning customers induces the firm that stays 
in the market to only concentrate on the first period potential customers, 
trying to convince them through prices and advertising that its product is not 
going to be available in future periods. Therefore, firms' tendency towards a 
pooling equilibrium in which they all try to persuade consumers with “last-
chance” sale advertising would be supported when the probability that 
customers return to the store is sufficiently low. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section considers the 
literature on signaling models, with special attention to quality signaling and 
the literature on multi-stage signaling games. Section 2 describes the 
preferences of consumers and firms, as well as the precise time structure in 
which this "last-chance-sale" signaling model evolves. Then, section 3 
analyzes the conditions under which a set of price-advertising combinations 
can be supported as a separating (or pooling) equilibrium of the signaling 
game. In this section, we also included some comparative statics results, 
which might shed some light on the main questions addressed in this paper. 
Afterwards, section 4 refines the set of equilibria found in previous sections 
by eliminating those equilibria sustained by “unreasonable” off-the-
equilibrium beliefs. Finally, we summarize the main results of this paper and 
comment about its further extensions. 
 
 
1.  Related literature 
 
The literature on signaling models, initiated by Spence (1973), has been used 
to explain a wide array of economic -but also political- situations, from limit 
pricing [Battacharya (1979) and Kose and Williams (1985)], to dividend 
policy [Milgrom and Roberts (1982)] and warranties [Gal-Or (1989)]. 
Interestingly, these models have also produced different explanations about 
uninformative advertising, i.e., the type of advertising where the information 
provided by the firm is unverifiable unless the consumer actually buys the 
good. In particular Nelson (1974) initially suggested the possibility that this Ensayos  64 
kind of advertising -such as the one conducted by a company which 
introduces a new good in the market- could work as a signaling device that 
firms use to distinguish the quality of their products. Specifically, bad 
quality firms would not find convenient to imitate such an advertising 
campaign since it is costly, and if it had any effect on the consumers' buying 
decision, this effect would vanish in the next period, as soon as buyers 
realize the bad quality of their product. 
 
The formalization of these ideas into a signaling model by Milgrom and 
Roberts (1986) provided the methodology for further research in this area. 
For instance, from a theoretical approach, Bagwell and Riordan (1991) 
analyze the signaling effect of highly stable versus declining prices as the 
number of customers of a given good increases, and Linnemer (2002) 
considers a similar model in which advertising is also included. In addition, 
Milgrom and Roberts' (1986) theoretical contribution triggered some 
empirical literature, such as Horstmann and MacDonald (2003), which 
checks the role of advertising as a signal of product quality in the compact 
disc player industry. Interestingly, many of these models consider 
multidimensional signaling, since firms are able to reveal their quality to the 
customers through prices and advertising. Additionally, they usually assume 
that all those consumers who bought the high-quality product buy it again in 
the future. Finally, Lazear (1986) analyzes clearance sales by showing how 
firms choose a declining path of prices for the good (such as fashionable 
goods).
3 Our model also examines firms’ price setting behavior, but 
complements it by introducing their optimal advertising strategies. 
 
This paper models a “last-chance” sale with a similar methodology to 
the above literature: firms can use both prices and advertising announcing 
their clearance situation to signal their type. Furthermore, customers can 
decide whether to return to the firm which is still in business, although this 
firm's products are perceived as not exclusive by consumers, since they can 
easily be found in the market along different periods of time. This fact 
reduces, hence, the firm's incentives to reveal its type when it is continuing 
its business. In addition, we allow for only a proportion of these customers to 
come back to this firm in the future. As this paper shows, the particular 
pattern of returning customers greatly conditions the pricing and advertising 
strategy of the firm which remains in the industry, which in turn helps in the 




                                                      
3 Extensions of this model include Epstein (1998) for applications to multiple goods, and 
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2.  Model 
 
Let us consider a signaling game in which consumers buy a (non-durable) 
consumption good from a firm. Initially, the firm privately observes its 
“type” θ={L,H} representing a low or high amount of product in the firm 
stocks. The low-stock firm represents here the seller (or product) which exits 
the industry in the next period, and the high-stock producer denotes the firm 
who keeps its business. Information about the level of stocks, θ, is not 
observed by consumers. In particular, the time structure of this game is the 
following: 
 
1.  Nature selects low or high stocks for the firm, with probability q 
and 1-q respectively. This information is revealed to the firm, but 
not to consumers. The stocks situation of a firm is assumed to be 
persistent over both periods of time. 
 
2.  The firm sets a price for its products  ∈ p R , and spends an 
amount 
+
∈ A  R +  on specific advertising which informs that this is 
the last chance of acquiring a certain product. 
 
3.  Observing the price-advertising combination (p, A) consumers 
update their beliefs about the probability that this combination 
comes from a low or a high stock firm. 
 
4.  Afterwards consumers choose whether they buy today at the current 
price, or they wait until next period. If consumers decide not to buy 
today, then they are only able to buy tomorrow if the true type of 
the firm is H. 
 
5.  If consumers decided not to buy in the previous period and the firm 
has high stocks, then the firm is called to set a second-period price, 
. If the firm had low stocks, then it exits the industry after the 
first period. In this period firms can set prices, but they cannot 
spend on advertising. 
2 p
 
6.  Only a portion α  of consumers returns to the same store in the 
second period. After observing second-period prices, and having 
perfect recall of the actions they observed in the previous period, 
consumers decide whether to buy the product, given their updated 
beliefs about the firm's true type. 
2 p
 Ensayos  66 
Specifically, every consumer can only buy in the second period from a 
firm with (persistent) high stocks. Otherwise -if the firm has low stocks- we 
assume that it exits the industry after the first period. Let π(p,θ,s) denote the 
payoff of a firm with true type θ={L,H}, which is perceived by consumers as 
a  s-type firm, where s={L,H}, and charges a price p in that particular 
period.
4 For example, π(p,H,L) represents the payoff for a high-stock firm 
which is perceived by customers as a low stock firm, i.e., consumers believe 
that the firm will exit. As this example emphasizes, s does not necessarily 
coincide with θ. Firm's profits are increasing in the price charged by the 
firm, p, no fixed costs are assumed, and no assumptions about the functional 
form of π(p,θ,s) are made
5. Furthermore, let π(pHH,H,H) represent the 
maximum profits that a high-stock firm perceived as such by consumers- can 
attain by selecting the optimal price pHH. We use a similar notation for the 
maximum profit level of any other combination of true and perceived firm's 
type. 
 
In addition, we assume that a firm's operating costs are lower when it is 
closing its business (low stocks) than when it still continues in the industry 
(high stocks). This assumption can be rationalized by considering that the 
opportunity cost of not selling today is higher for the high-stock than for the 
low-stock firm. Indeed, the high-stock seller is able to sell in the next period 
at a price above marginal cost. However, the low-stock seller cannot sell its 
products in the market anymore, so any remaining stocks from the first 
period must be sold at a price equal to its marginal cost during the second 
period, when the firm liquidates its assets. Hence, for any given price and 
consumers' beliefs, the low-stock firm's profits during the first period are 
higher than those of the high-stock firm, i.e., π(p,L,s)>π(p,H,s). Finally, note 
that this payoffs are only considering revenues and costs for a single period 
of time (either t=1 or t=2) and do not take into account advertising 
expenditures, A. 
 
Let the payoff of the representative consumers be U(p,θ)=θ-p from 
consuming one unit of the good (consumers demand either one or zero units) 
when the price of the good is p, and the stock level of the firm is θ ={L,H} 
where L,H∈R . In particular, we assume that consumers prefer to consume 
goods from firms that are really leaving the industry. That is, at a given price 
p, U(p,L)>U(p,H). This preference for products which will become scarce in 
the future can be understood in terms of a “snob effect”, or in a more general 
+
                                                      
4 Note that π(p,θ,s) represents the case in which the firm is the monopolist in the market, 
as well as other cases in which the product sold by the firm is sufficiently differentiated 
from that of other similar firms.  
5 Some additional conditions about π(p,θ,s) are only needed in section 4. “Last-chance” sales: what makes them credible?  67 
setting, because of a consumer's intention to price arbitrage along time
6. 




3.  Analysis of the sequential equilibria 
 
In this section we find the set of price-advertising combinations (p,A) which 
can be sent by the low stock firm, which is close to exiting the industry in 
order to fully reveal its stock conditions to the customers (separating 
equilibria). That is, we look for (p,A) pairs such that: (1) the low-stock firm 
prefers to send rather than being perceived as a high-stock producer; and (2) 
the high-stock type of firm do not find convenient to send -does not want to 
mimic the low-stock firm. The first of these incentive compatibility 
conditions is given by 
 
π(p,L,L)-A>π(pLH,L,H)           ( 1 )  
 
where p denotes a price level that, in addition to some “last-chance-sale” 
advertising, allows the low-stock firm to distinguish itself from the high-
stock seller. Note that in the above inequality no second period payoffs are 
included, since the firm exits the industry after the first period, and it cannot 
obtain any additional profits in the future, regardless of the beliefs that 
consumers may have about its actual stock conditions. Similarly, the second 
incentive compatibility condition, about the high stock producer, determines 
 
π(pHH,H,H)+ 2 απ ( ,H,H)>π(p,H,L)-A       (2)  2 p
 
Intuitively, the left hand side represents the high stock firm's equilibrium 
profits in a separating sequential equilibrium in which the firm is perceived 
as a high stock firm by consumers. As this expression indicates, the high 
stock firm payoffs are twofold: On one hand, its first period profits from 
being perceived as a high stock firm (which are maximized when the firm 
sets a price level of pHH). On the other hand, and since consumers identify its 
high stock condition, the firm can also sell in the future with a probability α. 
This probability can be interpreted as the proportion of customers who return 
to the store in the next period. If this is the case, the firm sets a profit 
                                                      
6 Different assumptions are valid regarding consumers' preferences. For example, many 
consumers may prefer to not buy during massive clearance sales in order to avoid using 
the same clothes, goods, etc. as the middle class, probably overrepresented in the 
population of buyers at these clearance sales. In this case, the “snob buyer” would prefer 
the high-stock firm products, so that he can keep some status from his purchases. The 
implications of such behavioral pattern are, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Ensayos  68 
maximizing price of  . The particular value of   that the firm sets must 
be  =H, since now the consumers perfectly infer the firm's stock condition 
from the fact that it is still operating.
2 p 2 p
2 p
7
     
Lemma 1. The high-stock firm's profit maximizing price in the second 
period is  =H.  2 p
 
Regarding the right hand side of (2), it denotes the utility of the high-
stock firm from setting a price p that, together with some “last-chance-sale” 
advertising, allows this high-stock firm to be perceived by customers as a 
low-stock producer. 
 
In addition to the above two incentive compatibility conditions, 
individual rationality constraints must also be considered for both types of 
firms, since otherwise they would not voluntary participate in this market. 
Specifically, we need that any firm's payoffs from this separating sequential 
equilibrium are higher than their reservation utility from not participating, 




π(pHH,H,H)+ 2 απ ( ,H,H)>0  2 p
 
These conditions are, however, derived from expressions (1) and (2) 
respectively. Indeed, if a firm's profits from not truthfully revealing its type 
(right hand side) are negative, a firm can set an extremely high price, which 
guarantees no sales and zero profits. That is, pLH in expression (1) (or 
respectively p in expression 2) can be made as high as needed, so that the 
right-hand sides of (1) and (2) are never negative. Hence, thereafter we 
consider conditions (1) and (2) as the only requirements for a separating 
(fully revealing) sequential equilibrium. Combining both conditions we 
obtain a range of values for the advertising expenditures in any separating 
equilibrium. 
 
π (p,L,L)-π(pLH,L,H)>A>π(p,H,L)-π(pHH,H,H)- 2 απ (p2,H,H) 
 
In order to identify the set of price-advertising pairs (p,A) that can be 
supported as a separating equilibrium -i.e., which satisfy conditions (1) and 
                                                      
7 Note that this must be both the original and the final stock condition of the firm in this 
two-period game, since we assumed that, for simplicity, the firm's stocks are persistent 
over both time periods. “Last-chance” sales: what makes them credible?  69 
(2) above- it is useful to represent the isobenefit curves of the low and high-
stock firms. In particular, we are interested in the locus of (p,A) 
combinations for which these conditions bind. Formally, we can then define 
the low-stock firm isobenefit curve by, 
 
{ ∈ ≡ ) , ( A p IL R
2 } ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( L H p H L p A L L p LH π π π = = −  
 
 
And, using expression (2) we can similarly characterize the high-stock firm's 
isobenefit curve 
 
{ ∈ ≡ ) , ( A p IH R
2 } A L H p H H p H H pHH − = + ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( 2 2 π απ π  
 
 
Graphically, all those (p,A) pairs below the IL curve represent points for 
which condition (1) holds strictly. Equivalently, (p,A) combinations above IH 






Importantly, both firm's isobenefit curves are concave in p. Indeed, for 
example, for a given level of the low-stock firm's profits, and given that the 
marginal costs of advertising are constant, the concavity of IL is satisfied 
because of the pattern of the marginal utility from increasing prices for a 
seller. In particular, this marginal utility from a price increase is positive Ensayos  70 
until pLL -intuitively, prices where the corresponding interval of the linear 
demand curve is inelastic- and beyond pLL the marginal utility from rising 
prices is negative -elastic intervals of the demand curve.
8 In other words, the 
marginal ratio of substitution between prices and advertising is positive until 
pLL, but negative thereafter. A similar analysis is applicable for the isoprofit 
IH. 
 
Additionally, note that lower isobenefit curves -curves closer to the 
price axis- represent higher profits for either firm. Further, since π ( ) do not 
include the advertising decision of the firm, one can observe that prices like 
pLL represent the profit maximizing price, given a particular advertising level 
A, for the low-stock firm when being perceived as such by consumers. 
Indeed, for a fixed level of A, the price pLL picks up the lowest isobenefit 
curve (the isobenefit curve closer to the price axis). 
 
Then, in a separating equilibrium, both types of firms want to reach the 
lowest possible isobenefit curve which is compatible with revealing its type 
to the customers. Hence, a low-stock firm chooses any (p,A) pair in the area 
below IL and above IH. If this were the case, a high-stock firm would find 
imitation profitable. Therefore, price-advertising pairs below IL and above IH 
offer the low-stock producer a greater profit than it could get by hiding 
information about its stocks. In addition, such (p,A) combinations offer a 
high-stock producer lower payoffs than it could obtain by setting advertising 
to zero and revealing itself as a high-stock firm. Therefore, the area below IL 
and above IH denotes all price-advertising combinations which can be 
supported as a separating equilibrium of this signaling game. Let us now 
analyze some comparative statics derived from the above incentive 
compatibility conditions. 
 
3.1. Comparative statics 
 
Let us analyze the comparative statics effects of varying second period 
incentives. In particular, we consider the dynamic incentives of the high-
stock producer, and specifically, the trade-off it experiences between selling 
today and waiting until the next period for future customers. We include 
proofs in the appendix. 
  
Lemma 2. The set of price-advertising pairs (p,A) that can be supported 
as a separating sequential equilibrium of the “last-chance-sale” signaling 
game increases in the proportion of customers, α, who come back to make 
purchases at the high-stock firm. 
                                                      
8 Note that this assumption is applicable to both linear and non-linear demand curves, as 
long as the price-elasticity of demand varies as a result of price changes. “Last-chance” sales: what makes them credible?  71 
 
The intuition of this lemma becomes clear if we look at condition (2), 
and check the effects of increasing α in the high-stock firm isobenefit curve. 
As the following figure indicates, the isobenefit curve IH shifts downwards 
as  α increases (i.e., reaching higher isobenefit levels). That is, as the 
proportion of customers who might come back to the high-stock firm rises, 
this producer is more willing to give up some first period profits. Indeed, this 
firm still obtains some profits, but higher than those it would obtain if it was 
able to identify its product as a “last-chance-sale” greatly appreciated by the 
customers. The cost of so doing for the high-stock seller would be to totally 
lose any second period sales, since the store would be identified as low-stock 
(having no future customers). This cost is clearly increasing in α, the 
proportion of customers who come back. Graphically, the set of (p,A) pairs 
below IH shrinks, and then the set of (p,A) combinations that can support 
separating sequential equilibria -area between IH   and IL- expands. 
Intuitively, the low-stock seller can now distinguish itself from the high-
stock one by sending higher prices and smaller advertising expenditures. In 
other words, increases in α benefit the low-stock producer since now its 
separating messages are “cheaper.” In contrast, the set of (p,A) pairs that can 
support separating sequential equilibria shrinks as α is further decreased. 
 
Figure 2 
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The above result can help us understand why, in recent years, so many 
advertising campaigns have insisted in the fact that their sales are clearance 
or “last-chance” sales. Indeed, more mobile customers -with an increasing 
array of traditional and internet shopping centers to choose from- reduce the 
probability that an individual customer returns to the same store (i.e., 
decreases  α). Hence, the set of (p,A) pairs which can support a fully 
revealing sequential equilibrium shrinks, and induces more firms to play 
pooling equilibria. In this situation, as commented above, both types of 
stores -the ones closing their business and those which continue their 
operations- set prices and advertising levels which try to convince customers 
about a “last-chance-sale” situation. 
 
The same idea is valid to explain why this type of advertising techniques 
are more commonly observed in cities than in small towns: the probability 
that a given customer returns to a particular store is significantly smaller in a 
big city than in a town, where the number of stores he can choose from is 
smaller. Summarizing, significant decreases in α increases the high-stock 
firm incentives to mimic the “last-chance-sale” strategy of the low-stock 
sellers, producing the recurrent pooling equilibrium. 
 
Remark 1. The above reasoning is also applicable to the second period 
profits. Specifically, note that since  =H, when the difference between H 
and the unit cost of this firm is small, then the profits per unit of the high-
stock seller decrease, reducing 
2 p
2 π ( ,H,H). The effects of this decrease 
into the set of separating equilibria are analogous to a reduction in α: the set 
of separating sequential equilibria shrinks. 
2 p
 
Remark 2. Finally, note that all this analysis and results can be extended 
to the case in which α represents the high-stock seller's discount rate, δ. In 
this case, a higher discount rate would indicate that the firm assigns a greater 
importance to future payoffs, and for this reason, it does not want to give 
them up (something that would happen if it mimics the low-stock seller). On 
the other hand, when δ approaches zero the high-stock firm does not assign 
any relevance to future profits, and tries to mimic the low-stock producer's 







                                                      
9 Note that even when α=0, as commented above -both in the interpretation of α as a 
proportion of returning customers and as the firm's discount rate- the high-stock seller can 
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4. Equilibrium  refinements 
 
Let us now turn to the set of separating sequential equilibria found in the 
previous section. This set is indeed large and reduces the predictive power of 
the analysis. In order to overcome this problem, in the next section we apply 
Cho and Kreps' (1987) intuitive criterion, which greatly reduces the set of 
separating sequential equilibria by allowing only “reasonable” off-the-
equilibrium beliefs. By so doing, we identify the set of Lowest Cost 
Separating Equilibria (LCSE) of this signaling game. The intuition of this 
criterion, when applied to this game, is clear: the low-stock firm just selects 
those (p,A) combinations which maximize its profits, provided that these 
combinations are able to signal its low-stock situation to the consumer. The 
low-stock firm achieves this in the solid line of the following figure, which 
exactly specifies those lowest price-advertising combinations among the 
ones which can be supported as a separating sequential equilibrium of the 
game. 
Figure 3 




Proposition 1. From the set of price-advertising pairs (p,A) which can 
be supported as a separating sequential equilibrium of the game, only those 
satisfying  
 
A L H p H H p H H pHH − = + ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( 2 2 π απ π    (3) 
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survive the Cho and Kreps' (1987) intuitive criterion. Let this set of 
remaining equilibria be denoted as Lowest Cost Separating Equilibria 
(LCSE). 
  
In order to formally characterize the set of LCSE, firstly note that a 






h l p p p ∈            ( 4 )  
 
This condition is not sufficient, however, for A>0. Graphically, we can 
see that a sufficient condition for positive advertising is that the isobenefit 
curves of both types of firms must be tangent at a price level p
T such that 
 
) ( h l
T p p p ∈            ( 5 )  
 
Finally, we must check that the above equilibrium indeed maximizes the 
low-stock firm profits. Indeed, (p*,A*) maximizes this firm profits as long as 
 
the isobenefit curve IL is quasiconcave in p       (6) 
 
Otherwise (p*,A*) would be a minimum of this firm profits, and there 
would be no separating equilibria with positive expenditures on advertising. 
     
Proposition 2. Take the set of LCSE.  
 
1.  If conditions (4)-(6) hold, then there exists a separating sequential 
equilibrium with positive advertising. If, in addition, condition (6) 
holds strictly, then there exists a unique separating equilibrium with 
positive advertising.  
 
2.  If either condition (4), (5) or (6) fails, then all separating equilibria 
involve zero advertising. 
 
Figure 4(a) illustrates the first point of the above proposition: a LCSE 
with positive advertising. If the low-stock firm's isobenefit curve is strictly 
quasiconcave as depicted in the figure, the separating equilibrium is unique. 
If this condition holds with equality there are, as a consequence, a continuum 
of (p,A) tangency pairs which satisfy conditions (4)-(6). In contrast, if either 
condition fails, then there does not exist any tangency point within the price 
interval (pl,ph). In this case, separating equilibria with no advertising exist, as 
figure 4(b) indicates. In fact, note that the equilibrium profile for this case “Last-chance” sales: what makes them credible?  75 
prescribes no advertising but a significantly low price, so that the low-stock 
firm can clearly signal its stock situation if it uses a low enough price. 
 
 








This paper analyzes a two-period signaling model in which a firm, which 
either continues or exits the industry, decides what price level to set and how 
many resources to spend on advertising. These two choice variables, in a 
separating equilibrium, are used by the firm to signal to its potential 
customers whether the firm will exit or stay in the market. We identify the 
set of prices and advertising, (p,A), which support fully revealing separating 
sequential equilibria. In addition, this set of separating equilibria was 
restricted to allow only “reasonable” beliefs, applying Cho and Kreps' (1987) 
intuitive criterion. 
 
The effects of modifying the dynamic incentives for the firm which 
continues in the market are also considered in a comparative statics analysis. 
In particular, reducing the proportion of returning customers expands the set 
of pooling equilibria, inducing all types of firms to announce “last-chance-
sales.” Similar effects are also identified for the case that second period 
profits are small, and when the sellers assign a low discount rate to future 
payoffs. 
 
It would be interesting to extend this two-period signaling game to a 
repeated signaling game. Indeed, firms and consumers interact in long 
relationships along time: some firms exit the market in the next time period, 
while other firms stay in business. In each period consumers and firms Ensayos  76 
would play a signaling game in which consumers updated their beliefs given, 
not only the current signals from the firm, but also all the past history of 
play. In this case the assumptions on the stochastic process of the random 
variable θ={H,L} over time become very relevant. If θ is assumed to be 
persistent along periods, then after the actual realization of θ is known at the 
end of period one, the continuation game starting at period two becomes a 
usual repeated game with complete information, as in Kaya (2004). 
 
If, in contrast, θ is assumed to be independently drawn each period of 
time, then past histories do not provide relevant information for the 
consumer that he could use in his belief updating. That is, the signaling game 
analyzed in this paper is repeated once and again, each period game being an 
isolated event. Probably, the most interesting repeated signaling model is 
that in which the stochastic process generating θ is correlated along time, 
i.e., the probability of drawing θ=H in period t depends on the probability of 
that particular realization in previous periods. Finally, it would also be 
important to extend the model to contexts where product quality is not 
perfectly observable to customers. In such case, advertising expenditures 





A.1 Proof of Lemma 1 
 
In the second period of the game, no other firm operates in the market, and 
consumer´s beliefs when observing any firm are concentrated on high stocks. 
Then, the firm sets a price   such that makes the consumer indifferent 
between buying and not buying the product, U( ,H)=  -H=0, i.e., 
=H.   
2 p
2 p 2 p
2 p
 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2 
 
From expression (2) we know that the incentive compatibility condition of 
the high-stock firm is π(pHH,H,H)+ 2 απ ( ,H,H)>π(p,H,L)-A, which 




{ ∈ ≡ ) , ( A p I H R } A L H p H H p H H pHH − = + ) , , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( 2 2
2 π απ π  
 
For a given increase in α, the set of (p,A) pairs above the isoprofit IH 
enlarges.   
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Let us assume that ( p , A ) is the equilibrium strategy profile of the low-








Let us first restrict consumer's beliefs when an off-the-equilibrium 
message is observed (i.e., when a price-advertising pair ( ˆ p , ) ≠ ( ˆ A p , A ) 
is observed) to only those types of firms from whom this off-the-equilibrium 
message is never equilibrium dominated. In order to simplify the 
consideration of different (p,A) pairs, let us start from pairs close to the IL 
frontier, and then take (p,A) combinations below IL, so that the firm's profits 
are higher (lower isobenefit curves). Formally, 
 
  Θ**( ˆ p , )={ θ ˆ A ∈Θ | π(p,θ,s)-A <
ˆ ˆ *( , , )






Since the L-type of firm can benefit from sending different messages (in 
the area) but the H-type of firm does not. 
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Second Step: 
 
Once consumers' beliefs have been restricted to Θ**, we must check 
whether the equilibrium payoff is smaller than the one associated with the 
restricted set of beliefs. Indeed 
 
  π(p,L,L)- A  < π(p,L,L)-  for all ( ˆ A ˆ p , ) ≠ ( ˆ A p , A ) 
 
Therefore, the initial equilibrium strategy profile ( p , A ) does not 
survive the intuitive criterion. The same argument can be carried out for any 
price-advertising pair which strictly belongs to the area representing the set 
of separating sequential equilibria. 
 
For any pair (p,A) in the boundary of the area representing the set of 
separating equilibria, however, the intuitive criterion does not eliminate any 
equilibrium because of holding “unreasonable” beliefs for off-the-
equilibrium messages. Indeed, the first step is applicable to all of them just 
as above. However, the second step does not eliminate any of these (p,A) 
pairs.  
 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2 
 
If condition (4) fails, then pLL<pl or pLL>ph, which implies A=0. If condition 
(5) fails, then the tangency point between isoprofits IL and IH occurs at a 
price level p
T<pl or p
T>ph, which also implies A=0. If condition (6) fails, then 
the firm could reduce A increasing profits. Then, all conditions (4)-(6) must 
be satisfied for a LCSE to be supported with positive advertising, A>0. In 
addition, if condition (6) holds strictly, the tangency point between the 
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